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During the Cold War, Canada and the United States worked together to create a mutual defense 
program to protect the North American continent from a potential Soviet attack.  As the Soviet 
Union and the United States entered into a nuclear arms race, the military defense of North 
America became absolutely imperative. By 1962, technology had been developed enabling both 
super powers to launch missiles over long distances. There was a dramatic shift from air bombers 
to missiles during the Cold War because missiles could be launched from farther away and had a 
larger capability for destruction. Canadians and the Americans soon realized that the only way to 
truly defend the North American continent from Soviet nuclear missiles was to create their own 
nuclear defense systems. The newly developed long- range missiles were called inter-continental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) because they could be launched over continents having a range 
between 6,000-9,300 miles.1 The Soviets likewise developed similar technology, and by 1958, 
they had the capability to launch an attack on the United States from Soviet soil. This new 
technology completely revolutionized the way nations’ conceptualized war and also the ways in 
which nations sought to defend themselves militarily.  
Despite shared interests in mutual defense, Canadians had a notably different perspective 
of the Cold War than Americans and played a distinctly different role in the war. The Canadian 
Arctic became the central focus of these converging yet distinct ideas of North American 
defense.  The quickest route for any assault upon the United States would have been over the 
Canadian Arctic. Inevitably, this placed Canada in the middle of a potential nuclear holocaust as 
tensions continued to ramp up between 1949 and 1963. Like all nations in the emerging bipolar 
world constructed by U.S. and Soviet policies, Canadian statesmen had to make important and 
difficult geopolitical decisions. Due to the fact that the nations shared a border and similar 
                                                 




political perspectives the U.S. and Canada were natural allies. But this natural alliance did not 
always translate into smooth bilateral action or even mutual diplomatic agreement during key 
moments of international tension. Working through these tensions remained a pressing issue in 
North American diplomacy during the Cold War. The joint defense between these two North 
American countries is historically significant because despite the weakness of personal 
diplomacy between the nations’ leaders, state diplomacy was remarkably successful in protecting 
the continent from perceived threats and in defusing the tensions of the Cold War.  
 
Building a Partnership: Origins of Joint Defense between the United States and Canada 
The cooperative tradition between Canada and the United States dates back to the early twentieth 
century when the United States and Great Britain began a series of international talks to 
discharge festering conflicts between the two powers on the North American continent. This 
cooperation between the United States and Great Britain did not always translate into 
comfortable relations between the United States and Canada.  During the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, Canada was fearful of the United States because of its expansionist 
tradition (Manifest Destiny) and the expressed desires of the United States to become the 
dominant continental power.   
 The tension between the United States and Canada was more than just diplomatic.  
Canada feared “Americanization” of their English speaking and French speaking cultures. 
Canada had only become an independent nation in 1867 thus it was far weaker economically and 
politically than their neighbor, thus making it vulnerable to an invasion if the United States 
sought to extend its borders northward. Canadians speculated that the United States would try to 
invade Canada since as of World War I they were an expansionist country. Knowing that the 
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U.S. had a larger population, stronger economy and had a history of aggression, Canadians had 
much to be concerned about. A 1921 Canadian Army record reported the following defense 
scheme in the event of “probable action of the United States”: 
The main objective of the United States force would undoubtedly be Montreal and 
on to Ottawa. The next important objective of the United States would be the 
occupation of the Ontario Peninsula including the cities of Hamilton and 
Toronto…the grain growing Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta 
which now have a large percentage of Americans, are especially attractive to the 
United States, and there is just a possibility that they might make the conquest of 
these Provinces the ultimate objective of their campaign…2 
 
The fact that Canada’s Army drew up military counter measures is evidence of the fear that 
Canada had of the United States.3 According to Canadian historians John H. Thompson and 
Stephen J. Randall in Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, in the early twentieth 
century, “British strategic planners viewed war with the United States ‘a contingency which, 
however improbable, is not impossible,’ but they secretly conceded that a successful defense of 
Canada was impossible.”4 Even a powerful naval country such as Britain knew that they could 
not possibly help Canada defend itself against the United States if the U.S. were to invade. 
However, the assumed failure to defend Canada is not as important as the fact that both Britain 
and Canada felt that some kind of defense was nonetheless necessary. The fear of a potential 
invasion from the United States, as it had done in the War of 1812, became a barrier that the U.S. 
and Canada had to overcome in order for joint defense to become a reality.  
World War II became an open stage for Canada to begin overcoming its fear of the 
United States. With the whole world in chaos, the United States was the least of Canada’s fears. 
                                                 
2 "Extracts from "Defence Scheme No.1". Army Records (April 12, 1921). James Eayrs. In Defence of  
Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression. Vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1964).  
3 It is necessary to note that the legitimacy of this speculation is hard for historians to determine because  
Canada technically still had these defense plans on the books. 
4 John H. Thompson, and Stephen J. Randall. Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies,  
2nd ed. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 71.  
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Due to its historic relationship with Great Britain, Canada was a key conduit for the cooperation 
between Great Britain and the United States during WWII. Canada’s role as an independent 
voice in building a cooperative relationship with the United States emerged in a fuller force with 
the outbreak of World War II. This wartime work eventually had important implications for the 
defense of North America and the rising importance of the Arctic in geopolitics.   
Prior to WWII, Canada did not see a need to defend its northern Arctic border. From a 
military point of view, the land in the Arctic was useless and its climate could prevent anyone 
from trying to capture the territory even if it did have intrinsic value. The authors of Arctic Front 
describe Lester Pearson’s “scorched ice” approach to defending the Arctic, immediately 
following WWII. Lester Pearson was Minister of External Affairs during Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker’s administration. He later became Diefenbaker’s successor and served as Prime 
Minister from 1963-1968. Pearson advocated for the following approach to defending the Arctic: 
“If you left the Arctic alone, as a deserted wasteland of ice and snow, it would be useless to the 
enemy, which would have to fight the natural elements simply to survive, never mind an 
attack.”5 It was not until the Soviet Union and the United States entered into a nuclear arms race 
that Canada found itself with a defenseless northern flank.  
 In 1940, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt met in Ogdensburg, New York, where they agreed to a mutual defense policy known 
as the Ogdensburg Agreement. The Ogdensburg Agreement was one of the first joint defense 
actions taken between Canada and the United States out of which the Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence was created.  In the agreement, the nations agreed that, “This Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence shall commence immediate studies relating to the sea, land and air problems, including 
                                                 
5 As quoted in Kevin S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William R. Morrison, and Greg Poelzer, Arctic  
Front: Defending Canada in the Far North (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008) 66. 
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personnel and material. It will consider in the broad sense of defense of the north half of the 
Western Hemisphere.”6 The creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence created a 
precedent in the defense policy that the United States and Canada adhered to during the Cold 
War years as they sought to defend themselves from the Soviet Union. 
H.L. Keenleyside (1898-1992) was the Secretary of the Canadian Section of the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (1940-1944).7 In a 1960 journal entry in the Canadian 
International, Keenleyside recounted the political relationship that developed between the 
United States and Canada during WWII. Although the time period precedes the Cold War, this 
journal entry is helpful to understanding the preexisting military cooperation between the two 
allies. In this article Keenleyside notes that in August of 1938 in Woodridge, Prime Minister 
King vowed a Canadian alliance to the United States stating: 
We too have our obligations as a good and friendly neighbour, and one of them is 
to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or 
possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it and that, should the 
occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by 
land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.8  
 
This statement was essential to creating a cooperative political relationship between the two 
countries. U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt responded to King’s speech in an address he 
gave at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario in 1938: “I give to you assurance that the 
people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by 
                                                 
6 H.L. Keenleyside. "The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945,"  
International Journal 16, no. 1 (1960): 51-52. 
7 David Webster. ‘Keenleyside, Hugh Llewellyn,  Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries  
General of International Organizations, edited by Bob Reinalda, Kent J. Kille and Jaci Eisenberg,  
www.ru.nl/fm/iobio 
8 Keenleyside, "The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-1945,"  
 52.  
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any other Empire.”9 WWII marked the realization that the two countries had the joint 
responsibility to defend the western hemisphere.  
During WWII, Canada and the United States utilized their new joint defense to bring an 
end to German and Japanese aggression. Canada provided everything from military supplies to 
ground troops to aid the Allied effort against Germany in the Atlantic theater. One of its most 
notable contributions was its role in the invasion of Normandy during the D-Day landings of 
June 1944 which 14,000 Canadians stormed Juno Beach and helped the Allies push further into 
German occupied France.10 Canada also partnered with the United States in the atomic energy 
research known as the Manhattan Project, which developed the notorious atomic bomb that 
helped end the war in Japan in 1945.11 Canada’s involvement in this research was defined in the 
Quebec Agreement of 1943 between the United States and the United Kingdom that established 
the nuclear weapons program (known as Tube Alloys in the UK).12 Although Canada was a self-
ruling nation at this point (Britain had granted Canada sovereignty in 1931), Great Britain still 
heavily influenced Canada’s foreign policy.13 Therefore, when Great Britain agreed to the 
Quebec Agreement, Canada and the other Commonwealth nations were inclined to join the 
nuclear project. 
                                                 
9 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Address at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.," August 18, 1938.  
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15525. 
10 D.W. Lane. "The Canadians On D-Day." Juno Beach. http://www.junobeach.info/. December 2014.  
11 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. "Canada's historical role in developing nuclear weapons."  
http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/fact-sheets/Canadas-contribution-to-nuclear-weapons-
development.cfm. 
12 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Canada's historical role in developing nuclear weapons." 
13 The 1931 Statute of Westminster was a British Act of Parliament that granted Canada control over its 
own foreign policy.  
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Before the war ended, Canada’s Department of External Affairs developed a report on 
Post-War Canadian Defence Relationship with the United States that was created on January 23, 
1945. This report concluded:  
That the defences of Canada should be closely co-ordinated with those of the 
United States after the war; that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence will 
continue to be a valuable means of facilitating this co-ordination; that the relations 
between the United States and the USSR are of special concern to Canada.14  
 
This report highlights the importance that Canada placed on its cooperation with the United 
States. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was a platform for this new cooperation. Even 
before the war ended, Canada recognized that it would have to play a role in maintaining the 
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Shortly after the war, in another example of successful state-level diplomacy, the United 
States and Canada created the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946. This committee met 
twice a year for the military staffs to meet and to discuss the state of the joint defense program 
between the two allies.15 On June 5, 1946, the two nations met to discuss the Joint Canadian-
United States Basic Security Plan. This plan called for a joint mission that committed the two 
countries to the following: “to defend the territory of Canada, Newfoundland and the United 
States, including Alaska, and to protect the vital sea and air communications associated 
therewith, in order to ensure the ultimate security of Canada and the United States.” The Joint 
Basic Security Plan was vital to strengthening relations between the two nations during the post-
war era. To achieve the goal of the missions, each nation was given a plan to meet the 
                                                 
14 “Post-War Canadian Defence Relationship with the United States: General Considerations," Department 
of External Affairs Files (January 23, 1945). "Report of the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities 
Problems,” in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, vol. 3 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press 1972) 375.  




requirements of joint tasks. For example, one of the joint tasks assigned was the defense of vital 
Canadian and United States territories from air attack. To achieve this goal, the Canadian Air 
Force, Army, and Navy were given specific instructions to co-operate with the United States and 
provide the necessary facilities and forces to achieve common protection. Meanwhile, the United 
States’ Army, Army Air Force, and Navy were given the same instructions to support their 
Canadian counterparts.16 The Joint Basic Security Plan helped lay the groundwork for the joint 
defense between the United States and Canada during the Cold War.  
Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union grew after WWII as the United 
States launched the international community into a nuclear arms race with the dropping of the 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.  A new need for military deterrence 
formed out of the fear that the Soviet Union would attack the United States or its northern ally, 
Canada.17  Historian Berry Zeller noted in On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of 
Arctic Sovereignty that during this time defense planners argued for a strong joint military effort 
between the U.S. and Canada not only for security issues but also for sovereignty issues.18 Much 
of this joint military effort focused on the Canadian Arctic and North Atlantic. 
 
The Beginnings of the Cold War in North America 
Canada’s Cold War did not originate in the Arctic; it first emerged in Canada’s capital in Ottawa 
with the 1945 “Gouzenko Affair.” Depending on how one dates the beginning of the Cold War, 
                                                 
16 “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan, 5 June 1946,” Mackenzie King Papers.  James  
Eayers, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, vol.3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,  
1972). 381.  
17Frances J. Dickinson. The DEW Line Years: Voices from the Coldest Cold War. (Nova Scotia: 
Pottersfield 
 Press, 2007) 11.  
18Barry S. Zellen, On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty. (Plymouth,  
UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009) 2.  
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one could argue that Canada actually faced the tensions of the new Cold War before the United 
States did. Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher clerk, defected to Canada in September 1945 
revealing to the Canadian government of the existence of a spy ring within their own ranks. 
Gouzenko revealed top-secret Soviet intelligence in return for Canada’s police protection. When 
the government learned that there were more Soviet spies in Canada, it raised paranoia among 
the public. In an attempt to quickly bring order to the chaos, the government invoked its wartime 
powers to detain, interrogate and prosecute those suspected of being communist Soviet spies.19 
The government even went as far as suspending habeas corpus.20 One month following his 
defection, on October 19, 1945, Gouzenko made an official announcement to the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP): 
During my residence in Canada I have seen how the Canadian people and their 
Government, sincerely wishing to help the Soviet people, sent supplies to the 
Soviet Union, collected money for the welfare of the Russian people, sacrificing 
the lives of their sons in the delivery of supplies across the ocean and instead of 
gratitude for the help rendered, the Soviet Government is developing espionage 
activity in Canada, preparing to deliver a stab in the back of Canada all this 
without the knowledge of the Russian people. Convinced that such double-faced 
politics of the Soviet Government towards the democratic countries do not 
conform with the interests of the Russian people and endanger the security of 
civilization, I decided to break away from the Soviet regime and to announce my 
decision openly. I am glad that I found the strength within myself to take this step 
and to warn Canada and the other democratic countries of the danger which hangs 
over them.21 
 
                                                 
19 The government invoked the War Measures Act 
20 Canada's Human Rights History, "Gouzenko Affair ." http://historyofrights.ca/history/gouzenko/. 
21 Igor Gouzenko, "Gouzenko's Statement to the RCMP," Commission’s Final Report. 638-640, in 




The resulting fallout became known as the Gouzenko Affair, which launched Canada into the 
Cold War by raising public paranoia and political tensions between Canada and the Soviet Union 
only two months after WWII ended. 22  
The largely perceived emerging crisis of Soviet aggression forced Canadians to 
reevaluate their position within North America. The historic fear among Canadians of US 
aggression northward now seemed to pale in comparison with the threat of Soviet aggression. 
The cooperation between the United States and Canada during WWII quickly evolved into its 
new Cold War context.  As such, the “front” of the war now moved into the North Atlantic and 
the Canadian Arctic. In Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America, 
Shelagh Grant argues that the postwar era perpetuated Canada’s paranoia towards a Soviet 
nuclear attack, which led to a conservative movement towards national defense. Grant also 
argues that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was not Canada’s only concern. The United 
States, Canada’s closest ally, was actually a primary Canadian Arctic concern during the postwar 
era as the U.S. sought land claims in the Arctic. Grant states, “With Canada’s large size, small 
population and limited financial resources, the risks attached to military dependence upon a 
powerful neighbor [the United States] at times seemed greater that the possibility of an enemy 
attack from the north.”23 Although this was indeed an important concern for Canada, Canadian 
fear of the Soviet Union (USSR) was far more severe, thus Canadian policy makers focused 
more on dealing with the threat of the USSR. During the Cold War, Canada had to defend itself 
against two superpowers in the Arctic; both the Soviet Union and the United States posed real 
threats, in Canada’s eyes. If Canada accepted the help of the United States in defending Canada’s 
                                                 
22 Canada's Human Rights History, "Gouzenko Affair."  
23 Shelagh D. Grant,  Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Vancouver:  
Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), p. 299.  
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northern border from the Soviets, Canada would inevitably allow the U.S. a military presence in 
the Arctic and therefore the opportunity to claim Canadian lands, a reality that Canada had 
resisted for more than seventy years. This concept is known as “defense against help” and is 
crucial to understanding Canadian defense decisions during the Cold War.24 This new North 
American cooperation, built upon precedents set during WWII but reached a new level of 
urgency because of the Gouzenko Affair, emerged not at the level of personal diplomacy 
between national leaders (as it had during WWII between King and Roosevelt), but at the level 
of institutional and agency cooperation. Evidence of this cooperation can be seen in the creation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, missile defense, the creation of the 
North American Air Defense Command known as NORAD in 1957, the BOMARC missile 
controversy in 1963, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1963.25  Historians refer to this era of US-
Canadian relations as the “era of convergence,” because the cooperation between the two nations 
helped protect North America from Soviet threats.26 
 
NATO 
During the 1940s, the United States changed its pre- war foreign policy approach from 
“isolationism” to a collective security approach. Future President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) 
advocated for the United States stay out of European affairs; but involvement soon became 
inevitable after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. During the war, the U.S. and its 
European allies learned the benefits of having global allies for defense and security measures. 
                                                 
24 Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, Poelzer, Arctic Front, 64. 
25William C. Armstrong, Louis S. Armstrong, and Francis O. Wilcox, Canada and the United States:  
Dependence and Divergence (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), p. 226.  
26 William C. Armstrong, Louis S. Armstrong, and Francis O. Wilcox, Canada and the United States:  
Dependence and Divergence, p. 225-226. 
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For Europe, NATO was a foreign policy tool to keep the United States’ attention and focus in 
European affairs in the post-WWII war era.27 Once the war ended, the United States was ready to 
formally enter into a collective security pact in hopes of preventing another world war.  
In 1949, the United States and Canada, along with other Western European nations, 
entered a collective security effort against the Soviet Union known as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). NATO was a military alliance amongst the Western powers that 
committed each nation to defending the collective if any one of their members was attacked. This 
was a direct response to the increasing tensions between the democratic/capitalist world and the 
growing Soviet-led communist world. Western powers feared that if one nation fell to 
communism, the other nations would follow suit. This idea was known as the domino effect and 
it largely influenced the foreign policy of the Western powers during the Cold War. As the 
Soviet Union expanded its borders to puppet regimes, fears of another world war began to 
emerge as tensions between communist nations and democratic nations climaxed. It was hoped 
that NATO would act as a deterrent for nations to wage war.  
The allied powers of the West created NATO to provide mutual-defense against Soviet 
aggression and to maintain the peace. If the Soviet Union attacked one nation of NATO, the 
members would consider it an attack against all NATO nations.28  NATO served as an incentive 
for the Soviet Union to maintain peace, knowing that the alternative could lead to another world 
war. As noted by Thompson and Randall, Louis St. Laurent (Prime Minister of Canada from 
                                                 
27 Geir Lundestad. "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952." Journal of Peace  
Research 23, no. 3 (September 1986). http://www.ies.be/files/private/17)%20Lundestad%20- 
%20Empire%20by%20Invitation.pdf. 




1948-1957), viewed NATO as an “’overwhelming preponderance of moral force,’ as well as 
economic and military power.’”29 
As stated in the treaty, the primary objective of the “moral force” was to commit the 
member nations to a determination:   
To safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, 
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. 
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are 
resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of 
peace and security.30 
 
Canada’s involvement in NATO proved to be crucial for the United States for three reasons: 
geography, a 40 year tradition of cooperation, and cross-border decision dynamics.31 The United 
States and Canada share a border that not only defines their geographic relationship, but also 
their political and military relationship. Due to the shared geography, the United States and 
Canada were mutually responsible for the defense of the North American continent. If Canada 
were to come under attack, the United States would be inevitably drawn into the conflict due to 
the close proximity of its ally. When the Cold War began between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, 
Canada was similarly caught between the two nations.32 In this fight, the Canadian Arctic 
became potential middle battleground. As mentioned previously, Canada’s Cold War began with 
the Gouzenko Affair; however, Canada chose to become more involved in the war, knowing that 
neutraility would not be an effective defense measure against the two world powers. Instead, 
Canada willingly chose to partner with the United States in the defense of the continent and 
democratic ideals.  
                                                 
29 As quoted in, Thompson and Randall. Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, p.192. 
30 North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 81 Cong. 1 sess, 3 pts.  
(Washington, DC., 1949), 1:1-4.  
31 Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States, 224. 
32 Armstrong, Armstrong, and Wilcox, Canada and the United States, 223. 
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Lester Pearson, minister of External Affairs during the creation of the treaty, later 
recalled: 
The North Atlantic Treaty was born out of fear and frustration; fear of the 
aggressive and subversive policies of communism and the effect of those policies 
on our own peace, security and well-being; frustration over the obstinate 
obstruction by communist states of our efforts to make the United Nations 
function effectively as a universal security system.33 
 
Pearson’s reflection provides a unique perspective of Canada’s primary purpose for signing the 
treaty. Canada signed the treaty out of fear of the spread of communism as well as frustration of 
communist nations trying to thwart the global movement of the U.N. to bring peace and security 
to the world. By signing the treaty, Canada chose to act as international player without direct or 
even indirect oversight from Great Britain. Partnering with the United States and the other 
NATO members was the best way for Canada to achieve its own political agenda as well as 
defend itself from the Soviet Union.  
For the United States, the creation of NATO was not only a response to the international 
Cold War but also to its own domestic Cold War, which emerged in the late 1940s under the 
guise of the “Red Scare” that infected the nation. The Red Scare was a paranoia and fear of 
communism that swept across the nation like wildfire in the 1940s and the 1950s. The fear of 
communists, or “reds,” was a result of the emerging Cold War between the United States and the 
Soviet Union after WWII. 34 Communist paranoia within the American government became 
evident with the creation of the Special House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities 
in 1938, later renamed the House of Un-American Activities (HUAC) in 1945. HUAC was 
responsible for investigating those accused of communist-like behavior. In 1950, former State 
                                                 
33 Lester B. Pearson, "On Signing the North Atlantic Treaty," Words and Occasions: An Anthology of 
Speeches and Articles Selected from His Papers.  Harvard University Press, 1970. 87.  




Department official Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury for lying about this involvement with a 
Soviet spy ring.35 Later in 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy further instigated this Red Scare by 
accusing 205 State Department officials of being communists.36 In his 1953 letter to President 
Eisenhower, McCarthy accused James B. Conant, a High Commissioner in Germany, of being 
unqualified for the job due to his favoring of communist ideals:  
Let me make it clear that I do not accuse Mr. Conant of being either Communist 
or pro-Communist. However, I strongly feel that his innocent statement about 
Communist activities in education and about the presence of communism in his 
own faculty indicate a woeful lack of knowledge the vicious and intricate 
Communist conspiracy. Certainly it doesn’t show any qualifications for the task 
of safeguarding the American Embassy at Bonn against Communist penetration, 
nor with the task of meeting the Communist threat in Western Germany 37 
 
McCarthy’s accusations of communism at home within the U.S. government fueled the public 
paranoia that created the Red Scare. The Red Scare put pressure on the United States to make a 
bold move to bring about the end of communism. For the United States, NATO was in part a 
domestic political maneuver to stop the outbreak of fear and paranoia within U.S. borders, and 
also a foreign policy tool designed to deter and contain communism in Eastern Europe. The 
United States was late in providing troops on the ground in both WWI and WWII, so it had to 
convince Europeans that they would respond more quickly to Soviet aggression. Yet, within the 
realm of international politics, NATO also related to U.S. needs in North America.  It was crucial 
to the United States that Canada joined NATO to better protect North America internally from 
another red scare and an externally from a Soviet attack.  
                                                 
35 PBS: NOVA Online . "Alger Hiss." http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/venona/dece_hiss.html. 
36Landon R.Y. Storrs. "McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare." American History Oxford Research  
Encyclopedias (July 2015).  
http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore- 
9780199329175-e-6. 
37Joseph McCarthy, "United States Senate Committee on Government Operations," Dwight D.  







NATO was a paper document, but it needed actual military backing. In North America, that 
backing came first in the form of missile defense. During this era of convergence, Canada 
actively cooperated with the United States through agency relations rather than personal 
diplomacy to create early warning systems because they shared the same security concerns as the 
United States. As early as 1946, statesmen in Canada and the United States thought of the 
possibility of building a radar chain in the Arctic to give advanced warning of a Soviet attack. 
However, it was not until 1951 that the United States and Canada created the Pinetree Line, the 
first of three different radar systems.38 The Pinetree line consisted of 44 radar stations that 
stretched across the northern border of the United States and the southern border of Canada. The 
project was officially completed by 1954, but by then a new radar defense project was already in 
motion: the Mid-Canada Line.39  The Mid-Canada Line, also known as the McGill Fence, 
stretched along the fifty-fifth parallel, north of the Pinetree Line. Canada was interested in the 
McGill Fence for three different reasons. To begin with, Canada had the technical capacity 
available domestically as Canadian scientists at McGill University had recently developed the 
radar technology. Canada also viewed the project as a way to save money since building radar 
stations in the middle of the country would be more affordable than trying to build a chain of 
radar stations in the Arctic. Lastly, the Mid-Canada Line avoided the issue of an American 
presence by being a purely Canadian-funded and operated project.  By the time the project was 
finished in 1957, Canada had built 98 radar stations at the cost of $250 million.40 The Mid-
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Canada line demonstrated Canada’s commitment to the United States in preventing the Cold War 
from becoming a hot war.  
In November 1954, the United States and Canada decided that a more sophisticated radar 
system was needed and agreed to build the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line). The DEW 
Line was yet another radar system that would warn the governments of a Soviet nuclear attack.41  
The DEW Line was to be located above the Mid-Canada Line across the Canadian Arctic. 
During the Cold War, thousands of men from across the continent, ranging from civilians and 
military officials to engineers, were sent by the United States military to the Arctic to help create 
this new warning system. In order to strengthen Canadian sovereignty claims as U.S. troops 
began to flood the region, Canada relocated Inuit families to the High Arctic and employed them 
wherever possible.42 Inuit presence on radar sites effectively increased Canadian participation in 
the project, at least on the surface. The original DEW Line agreement with Canada stated that 
American forces should avoid contact with local Inuit unless they were employed and had the 
approval of Canada’s Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources: “All contact with 
Eskimos, other than those whose employment on any aspect of the project is approved, is to be 
avoided except in cases of emergency.”43 American troops were told that Inuit were “susceptible 
to disease,” thus contact was not allowed. Over time, however, the nations relaxed the clause as 
it was rarely ever enforced by the local military authority; soon, many Inuit found themselves 
working side by side with the American and Canadian military.44 
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Since Canada had taken responsibility for creating the Mid-Canada line, the U.S. agreed 
to fund the construction and the installation of the DEW Line as long as the Canadian 
government agreed to assist the US operation whenever necessary.45  In a note sent to U.S. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles from the United States’ Canadian Ambassador Doug Stuart 
in November 1954, Canada informed the United States of its DEW Line proposal: 
The Canadian Government has now considered a proposal put forward through 
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence that the construction of the Distant Early 
Warning element of the over-all joint Canada-United States warning system 
should be the responsibility of the United States Government. The Canadian 
Government concurs in this proposal subject to the conclusion at an early date of 
an agreement as to the terms which shall govern the work. At the same time, 
however, the Canadian Government wishes to state its intention to participate in 
the project, the nature and extent of such participation to be determined in the 
near future.46 
 
The project was completed in 1957 and consisted of 22 radar stations. The cooperation between 
the two allies helped create what was believed to be an effective early warning radar system that 
would mutually defend both nations.  
The DEW Line was a product of the United States’ fear of an attack by the Soviet Union 
via air bombers and ICBMs as the Cold War continued to escalate. The United States needed 
Canada to build up its early warning system in order to protect the continent from a Soviet aerial 
offensive. If Canada could protect itself from the Soviets, it would in turn be protecting its 
southern neighbor. It was in the self-interest of the United States to build the DEW Line in 
Canada; Canadians naturally agreed to the building of this project because they too benefited 
from the safeguard that the DEW Line provided. The United States Air Force was responsible for 
evaluating the radar sites and served as communication liaison for the United States for the 
                                                 
45 Dickinson. The DEW Line   Years: Voices from the Coldest Cold War, 11. 
46 Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the United States Of America Governing the  




supply and service centers.47 Militarily, the DEW Line was a necessity for U.S. defense. 
Politically, the DEW Line allowed for a larger U.S. presence in Canada for the staffing of radar 
stations. This later became a point of tension between the United States and Canada as 
sovereignty issues emerged, despite the fact that the United States agreed that Canadian 
sovereignty in the north would not be compromised as a result of the project.48 Other historians 
however, argue that Canada’s media and opponents of the DEW Line made the controversy 
about sovereignty bigger than it actually was by highlighting the fact that the U.S. exercised its 
right to turn away Canadian visitors without security authorization.49 For the most part, Canadian 
officials agreed that the Americans were respectful of Canada’s concerns about sovereignty and 
acknowledged Canadian control of the Arctic. 50 The authors of Arctic Front argued, “The DEW 
Line contributed more to Canadian sovereignty in the North than it took away from it.” The 
DEW Line was not a sovereignty issue; rather it helped the United States and Canada unite under 
the recently created North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) to meet the need of an 
intercontinental defense system. 51 The missile defense systems, that were made up of radar 
systems and anti-ballistic missiles developed by Canada and the United States, demonstrate how 
the cooperation amongst government agencies strengthened the joint defense of the two nations.   
 
NORAD 
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), headquartered in Colorado Springs, was 
another mutual defense program in which the United States and Canada collaborated. NORAD is 
                                                 
47 David Nuefeld, "The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: A Preliminary Assessment of its Role and  
Effects upon Northern Canada." Arctic Institute of North America.  
http://www.stankievech.net/projects/DEW/BAR-1/bin/Neufeld_DEWLinehistory.pdf. 
48 Dickinson. The DEW Line Years: Voices from the Coldest Cold War, 17. 
49 Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, Poelzer, Arctic Front, 74. 
50 Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, Poelzer, Arctic Front, 74.  
51 Coates, Lackenbauer, Morrison, Poelzer, Arctic Front, 75.  
21 
 
a bilateral defense organization between the U.S. and Canada that was established to coordinate 
the military cooperation of the two nations in the creation of the early warning systems in 
Canada.  In September 1957, the two nations created the NORAD agreement to defend, protect, 
and control the air space of North America during the war.52 It was not until nine months later on 
May 12, 1958 that the agreement was officially announced.53 Even before the nation’s leaders 
announced the agreement, military leaders from both the U.S. and Canada were already 
cooperatively working with one another to make joint defense possible. NORAD is further 
evidence of the productivity of military cooperation as opposed to personal diplomacy during the 
Cold War.  
The new defense command was responsible for the coordination of defense production 
and the development of sharing agreements between the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF).54 The two air forces were developed and operated the early 
warning radar sites and systems, which acted as a “trip wire” against air attacks. For Canada, 
NORAD was an opportunity to defend itself and their U.S. ally from the threat of a Soviet attack. 
Typically, the Commander of NORAD is a U.S. military officer and the Deputy Commander is 
usually Canadian. This is indicative of the junior role that Canada plays compared to its southern 
ally.55 Despite its junior role, Canada’s partnership was essential for this mutual defense 
agreement because of the way that it benefitted the Canadian government and military. 
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According to the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba in 
Canada, NORAD allowed Canada the following defensive benefits: 
For Canada, air defence cooperation and subsequently NORAD had other significant 
benefits. It provided access to the greater military resources of the U.S. through which the 
U.S. provided, for example, majority funding for relevant NORAD infrastructure in 
Canada. This infrastructure, in turn, enhanced Canadian sovereignty not just in terms of 
control over its expansive air space in the Canadian North, but also through the presence 
of ground installations across the North. It gave Canada access to U.S. air defence plans, 
thereby ensuring unique Canadian air defence requirements would be taken into account. 
It was also Canada’s entry point into the strategic world. NORAD’s missions required 
access to vital intelligence on Soviet capabilities, which Canada could not acquire on its 
own.56 
 
During the Cold War, NORAD also allowed Canada to assert its national sovereignty through 
the use of air patrols, infrastructure, and surveillance. The benefits of participating in NORAD 
with the United States far outweighed the cost of joint defense with the United States. Due to the 
vastness of the Canadian geography, Canada struggled to assert sovereignty over its territory; 
however, through NORAD the United States promised to partner with Canada and ensure that its 
national sovereignty remains intact.  
For the United States, NORAD was another military maneuver, designed like NATO, to 
achieve a political outcome. In 1950, in National Security Council Document 68, the United 
States government concluded that the best way to combat the communist Soviet threat in the East 
was to build up its military arsenal, including nuclear weapons.57 The document also argued for a 
containment approach to communism through the development of a “healthy international 
community” with other like-minded nations.58 NSC 68 argued:  
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We must by means of a rapid and sustained build up, of the political, economic, 
and military strength of the free-world, and by means of an affirmative progress 
intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing 
evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the 
Kremlin design dominated by its will.59 
 
NSC 68 outlined the need for the United States to not only build up its military weapons but also 
its political weapons in the form of joint defense agreements with allied nations of the free 
world. NORAD was product of this new policy. In this sense, the NORAD agreement helped 
secure freedom and democracy against communism. While NORAD was a military defense 
agreement, it served the political purpose of strengthening the allied relationship between the 
U.S. and Canada. In March 1981, NORAD was renamed to the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command to  “include the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection, 
validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space 
vehicles,” as according to the defense command. The incorporation of space defense was the 
product of the space race between the U.S. and USSR. NORAD was the first bilateral and 
binational agreement ever to be made between two nations. The NORAD agreement reflects the 
success of state level diplomacy and military cooperation in creating a joint defense command in 
the face of Soviet aggression.  
 
BOMARC Missile and a North American Nuclear Policy 
A new era of divergence filled with tension and hostility began to emerge after Canada’s 
acceptance into NORAD. As a new member of NORAD, Canada needed to build up its air 
defense in order to meet the requirements that were established in the NORAD agreement. The 
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BOMARC (Boeing-Michigan Aeronautical Research Center) missile was a ground to air missile 
that was designed to carry a nuclear warhead. It could help Canada satisfy NORAD’s 
requirements; however, at the time Canada lacked nuclear warheads. By September 1958, 
Canadian defense officials began debating whether it was in the best interest of the nation to 
acquire nuclear warheads from the United States to strengthen their joint defense. 60 The desire 
to obtain nuclear warheads contrasted with Canada’s international policy that stated that Canada 
was opposed to the spreading of nuclear weapons. Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Board was 
created in 1946 under the Atomic Energy Control Act.61 This Board, despite working with the 
United States on the Manhattan Project, chose to have a non-nuclear weapons policy after 
witnessing the devastation that the atomic bombs had caused.  By 1958, however, the United 
States urged Canada to incorporate nuclear missiles as part of its fulfillment of the NORAD 
agreement. Canadian leadership tried to appease these conflicting initiatives by emphasizing the 
defensive nature of the country’s nuclear goals. In January 1960, Prime Minister John G. 
Diefenbaker (1957-1963) prepared the following message for the Canadian Armed Forces:  
The Government believes in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons at the 
independent disposal of national governments. We are planning arrangements 
now for arming the Canadian forces with defensive weapons using nuclear 
warheads, which will be consistent with this principle. Our need for such weapons 
will arise only in defensive operations taken jointly with the forces of the United 
States.62 
 
In 1960, Diefenbaker was prepared to accept the nuclear warhead for the BOMARC missile; 
however Canada did not receive it until 1963 when Lester B. Pearson was elected Prime 
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Minister. Diefenbaker received public criticism for even considering a shift in policy, which 
delayed his decision and marked the beginning of the BOMARC missile “crisis.”  
Canadian newspapers in 1963 shared a common theme claiming that the buildup of 
Canada’s defense was a role that was long delayed, yet a role that should be readily accepted. At 
the time, the Canadian public was embarrassed to learn that their country still failed to meet the 
NORAD requirements and urged their government officials to do whatever it took to meet 
NORAD demands, even if it meant accepting a new nuclear defense policy.63  In the Montreal 
Gazette on January 7, 1963, the newspaper reflected popular Canadian public opinion when it 
reported that, “This [failure] is a serious and embarrassing situation.” Despite the feeling of 
embarrassment that some people had, public opinion in Canada was split regarding the decision 
of Canada accepting to nuclear weapons. On January 15, 1963, the Toronto Daily Star published 
their statement of opposition to the acceptance of nuclear arms by Canada. Joseph Atkinson, 
President and publisher of the Star argued that the United States should be in possession of the 
nuclear weapons, not Canada: 
It will be a step in that dangerous direction if Canada accepts atomic missiles—
even one of relatively limited capacity. Such a development will increase the 
pressure on the United States to supply nuclear arms to its other allies, in Asia as 
well as Europe.64 
 
Atkinson believed that the buildup of nuclear weapons in Canada would only prolong the nuclear 
arms race rather than promote the peace that Canada was committed to maintaining.65 Yet 
Samuel Lubell, a public opinion reporter and an American freelance journalist, learned through 
interviewing Canadians that “the confidence of the Canadian public in the BOMARCs had been 
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just about destroyed.” Meanwhile, other Canadian voters resented the testimony of Defense 
Secretary Robert McNamara, which was widely interpreted as meaning, ‘the BOMARCs are just 
decoys to draw fire away from American cities.’’66 Political tensions within the Canadian 
government at this time along with a divide in public opinion delayed Canada’s decision to 
obtain nuclear weapons to strengthen its joint defense with the United States at the height of the 
Cold War. 
 The BOMARC missile was not only designed to meet the needs of NORAD, but also to 
assert Canadian defense power and to reestablish Canada as a “little great power” in the midst of 
the Cold War.67 The BOMARC was designed to replace the AVRO Arrow. The AVRO Arrow 
was an jet interceptor designed to destroy air attacks, however, it proved to be ineffective in an 
era of nuclear weapons and missile technology.68 Although BOMARC was an American-made 
missile, Canada requested BOMARC missiles for its defense program. For the RCAF, I was 
hoped that the BOMARC missile provided air defense against Soviet missiles and aircraft.69 The 
BOMARC missile was also an opportunity for Canada to recover from the financially draining 
AVRO Arrow project and replace air bombers with nuclear warheads.70 Canada received 56 
BOMARCs in 1961, which the United States paid for while Canada paid for the military sites 
that would host the missiles near North Bay, Ontario.  
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 Ironically, by the time Canada received the BOMARCs, the United States began to 
question the military effectiveness of the BOMARC but by then it was too late; Canada had 
already committed to the missile program. Although Prime Minister Diefenbaker agreed to 
purchase the missile from the Americans, he refused to purchase the nuclear missile warhead that 
would make the weapon effective. This resulted in a dispute between the United States and 
Canada as to how the BOMARC missile ought to be utilized. In a 1958 test, a BOMARC missile 
successfully intercepted a Navaho missile flying off of Cape Canaveral, Florida despite earlier 
U.S. Army reports that the missile was an ineffective military weapon. The missile testing 
reassured Canada that the BOMARC missile was indeed a worthy investment.  
Although Diefenbaker never made an executive decision on the new proposed nuclear 
defense policy, his Liberal opponent Pearson, argued that Canada ought to adopt the new policy 
in order to meet the requirements of NORAD and NATO and to better support its allies. The 
controversy between the United States and Canada highlighted the different approaches that the 
two nations had towards national defense and fueled the already soaring tensions between 
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker.71 The nuclear weapon controversy also led 
to a split within Diefenbaker’s own Cabinet, all of which aided the election of Prime Minister 
Pearson in September 1963. The BOMARC “missile crisis,” as it is now commonly remembered, 
was not so much a military crisis as it was a diplomatic crisis between the United States and 
Canada as the nations sought the most efficient and cost effective way to defend the North 
American continent.   
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 Once Canada agreed to add nuclear weapons to its arsenal, a new issue arose: who would 
have control over the nuclear devices? The United States paid and produced the weapons; 
therefore the BOMARCs were U.S. property. Canada readily allowed the U.S. to claim 
ownership due to the fact that Canada had committed to a peacekeeping approach to defense that 
included not having nuclear weapons. Jurisdiction and sovereignty issues arose once the 
BOMARCs were moved onto Canadian soil. Canada claimed that since the BOMARCs were on 
Canadian soil, Canada had the authority to control and use the devices as they deemed 
appropriate. This was not the first time when the United States faced this sovereignty issue. In 
Britain, in order to avoid jurisdiction dispute with the nuclear weapons, the nations agreed to the 
“dual-key” system. The dual-key system imposed a policy in which both an American and a 
British officer had to jointly arm the nuclear weapon before it was used. This was done so that 
Britain had the opportunity to veto the use of the weapons and not be “pulled unwittingly” into 
an American nuclear war. Although the dual-key system was successful in Britain, the United 
States was hesitant to adopt the same system in North America.72 In a 1961 memorandum for 
President Kennedy, the White House secretary recorded the following report regarding the 
meeting between Kennedy and Diefenbaker on February 20:  
The President and the Prime Minister met at the White House. In the course of a 
long discussion, the Prime Minister raised with the President the question of the 
“joint defense of North America.” Although there was no commitment by the 
Prime Minister to any nuclear weapons posture, the text of the memorandum of 
conversations indicates the Prime Minister suggested to the President that the 
United States and Canada conclude a nuclear weapons agreement similar to that 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.73 
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Diefenbaker’s proposed dual key system called for nuclear weapons to not be held on Canadian 
soil so that it would not interfere with its claim to be a non-nuclear power. The system also 
allowed Canada the same veto privileges as it did Britain. Diefenbaker wanted the BOMARCs to 
be held on U.S. soil and then shuttled across the border in the event of a crisis that would involve 
Canada to change its stance on nuclear weapons. This proposition, however, was not practical.74 
The Kennedy administration urged Diefenbaker to change its nuclear policy; however, it was not 
until Pearson became Prime Minister in 1963 that Canada officially adopted an agreement with 
the United States to obtain nuclear warheads.75  
Historian Patricia I. McMahon summarizes this complex controversy in her book Essence 
of Indecision: “No doubt, such an approach [storing nuclear weapons in Canada] would be a 
show of good faith [to the United States] in the pursuit of a bipartisan foreign policy (for which 
the media had praised the government in the recent campaign), but it could also be construed as a 
sign of insecurity and uncertainty.”76 The Canadian government feared that complying with the 
United States’ request would be a sign of weakness rather than evidence of a strong joint defense 
between the two nations. By the end of 1962, Diefenbaker’s indecision contributed to his 
government’s fall and his nation without nuclear weapons.  
In a speech given in January of 1963, Pearson stated that Canada’s new nuclear policy 
was created because “Canada must continue the closest possible co-operation with the United 
States and with her friends in NATO. She must do nothing to weaken continental or NATO 
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collective policy and action.”77 Pearson’s new administration ushered in a dramatic change from 
Diefenbaker’s conservative politics, promising Canadians that they would honor their historic 
commitment to the United States to not only strengthen Canada but also to better protect her 
from the threat of the Soviet Union.  
The creation of the BOMARC missile brought change to U.S. defense policy. In a letter 
to Senator Dennis Chavez (Democrat- New Mexico), the chairman of the Defense Sub-
committee on Appropriations, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy wrote the following about the 
United States’ new defense strategy:  
In our planning for the protection of the North American continent against air 
attack, we visualize a defense in depth which consists of three stages. The first 
attempt to destroy or turn back invading aircraft would be made by our 
interceptors, supersonic planes which would meet the enemy as far out from our 
own borders as can be done. The second state would be furnished by the Bomarc 
which, in the new version, will have a range of 400 miles. Again, the attempt 
would be to reach out and intercept the attacker as he comes closer to but before 
he reaches our continental borders. Finally, as a third stage, the Nike Hercules 
would be sited for additional close-in protection of high priority targets.78 
 
McElroy believed that the BOMARC had the potential to redefine the way the United States 
defended itself from the Soviet Union due to its long missile range, and this relied on 
cooperation with Canada. However, as mentioned previously, U.S. military officials argued that 
that the missile was ineffective.  
 For Canada, the BOMARC “crisis” revealed the distrust that Canada still had toward 
American diplomacy, yet the incident also highlighted the willingness of the Canadian 
government to incorporate nuclear missiles into its military upon request of the United States. 
Despite all of the criticism the Canadian government received for their decision, they stood by 
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their commitment to their ally. Although many military officials in the United States did not like 
the BOMARC missile due to the fact that they believed it to be militarily ineffective, the United 
States could not deny the Canadian effort to satisfy the NORAD requirement of obtaining 
nuclear weapons for their arsenal.   
 
The Herbert Norman Affair 
Even in the midst of cooperation within NATO, NORAD, and the BOMARC “missile crisis,” by 
the late 1950s, Canadians developed a sort of wariness of American policy (though not 
Americans) and worried about becoming too closely aligned with American Cold War policy 
initiatives. This change in public opinion toward American policy came in the wake of the death 
of Herbert Norman, a Canadian diplomat in Egypt. As a student in the 1930s, he was a member 
of a communist club at Oxford. By the mid-1950s Norman was outed as a communist and 
hounded by the McCarthyite House Committee on Un-American Activities as the United States 
became infected by the Red Scare. Distraught, he committed suicide. Although it is not fair to 
conclude that American policy in the form of McCarthyism resulted in Norman’s death, this is 
exactly what the Canadian public concluded. In a House of Commons debate on April 4, 1957, 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker captured the Canadian sentiment when he stated, “I think all of us in 
this house cannot but feel a sense of deep sorrow that this man’s good name was filched from 
him by indiscriminately branding him as an enemy, trying him by suspicion and, in the public 
mind to great extent, convicting him by innuendo.”79 Norman was a public figure, and Canadians 
viewed the suicide of their diplomat as a need for Canada to distance themselves from American 
diplomacy. On April 4, 1957, the Toronto Daily Star reported on the incident:  
                                                 




Norman was reported by associates to have been depressed in recent days over the 
continuing attempts by the U.S. subcommittee to smear him. As late as March 28 
the sub-committee on internal security, ignoring protests both by Canada and its 
own state department, released further testimony alleging that Norman had been 
linked with communism. The U.S. state department, following Canada’s protest 
over release of similar material March 14, had asked the sub-committee not to 
release the later testimony because ‘it might be damaging to our friendly relations 
with Canada.’ The state department repudiated the sub-committee allegations 
against Norman, saying that they did not represent the opinions of the U.S. 
government.80 
 
Despite the U.S. State Department’s attempt to rid itself of the blame for Norman’s death, 
Canadian media was already holding the United States responsible. In the very same newspaper, 
William Stevenson reported that Herbert Norman’s death was a result of the United States witch- 
hunt of communists; meanwhile another Canadian reporter Bruce MacDonald of the Toronto 
Daily Star titled his article following the death of Norman “Murdered by Slander.” Canada’s 
media fueled public distrust toward the United States as they blamed the United States (more 
specifically McCarthy and the House for Un-American Activities Committee) for harassing 
Norman into suicide.81 
In response to the outcry of the public, Canada decided to cut off security information to 
the United States in hopes of avoiding another diplomatic nightmare. In a 1957 letter to Norman 
Robertson the Canadian Ambassador in the United States, Lester Pearson, then the Canadian 
Secretary of State for External Affairs, delivered the following message to the United States, “I 
am instructed by my Government to inform you with regret that the Canadian Government will 
be unable in future to supply any security information concerning a Canadian citizen to any US 
Government agency.” In a latter part of Pearson’s letter, however, he wrote assuredly that 
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Canada has no desire “to upset in any way the long standing and friendly relations between the 
FBI and the RCM Police. Nor do we wish to upset the new and satisfactory relations between the 
US Immigration and Naturalization Service and the RCM Police.”82 Despite the distrust that the 
Canadian public seemed to have toward the United States after Norman’s death, the Canadian 
government had to balance public pressure with the real need to maintain the good relations with 
the United States. It can be argued that the only reason why Canada chose to cut off its security 
information to the U.S. was to appease the Canadian public. Pearson’s letter appears to assure the 
United States that despite the public reaction, Canada was not ready to ruin the allies’ 
relationship.  
 
Cuban Missile Crisis  
The response of the Canadian public combined with the new military shift toward to the 
BOMARC missiles resulted in a major diplomatic crisis between the United States and Canada.  
Add to this the fact that Kennedy and Diefenbaker already had mounting tensions in their 
political relationship, a darkening cloud emerged over the Canada-US relationship.   
 The Cuban missile crisis began on October 14, 1962 when an American U2 spy plane 
flying over Cuba photographed the construction of several Intermediate Range Ballistic missile 
(IRBMs) deployment sites built by the Soviet Union. The U2 spy plane revealed that the Soviets 
were building up an arsenal of nuclear missiles in Cuba. After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion 
(April 1961), Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro made a deal 
that allowed the Soviets to place nuclear weapons on Cuba to prevent another attempt by the 
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United States to invade Cuba. Cuba received the benefit of Soviet protection from the United 
States, while the Soviets received the benefit of having a military arsenal right off the coast of 
the United States at the height of the Cold War between the two nations.83 Now, the Soviets 
could challenge their enemy right in its own backyard. Kennedy and his National Security 
Council agreed that it was unacceptable for the Soviets to place their missiles there, as it 
threatened the lives of innocent Americans. The question at hand was how to convince the 
Soviets to remove their missiles without triggering a nuclear conflict.84  
 U.S. President Kennedy received a briefing about the missiles in Cuba on October 16, 
1962, yet he chose not to consult world leaders until a few days into the crisis. There is no 
evidence that Kennedy even considered consulting Diefenbaker. In fact, the only communication 
that Kennedy had with Diefenbaker was a letter on October 19 asking Canada for support of a 
UN resolution calling for a moratorium on nuclear testing.85 Three days later, in a telegram on 
October 22, 1962 (one week after Kennedy was first informed), Kennedy wrote the following 
message informing Diefenbaker just before his address to the American people:  
My dear Prime Minister: 
I am asking Ambassador Merchant to deliver to you the text of a public 
statement I intend to make today at 1900 hours Washington time. It is occasioned 
by the fact that we are now in the possession of clear evidence which Ambassador 
Merchant will explain to you, that the Soviets have secretly installed offensive 
nuclear weapons in Cuba, and that some of them are already operational.  
As you will see from my speech, I consider that the situation calls for the 
immediate execution of certain quarantine measures whose object is to prevent 
the introduction into Cuba of further nuclear weapons, and to lead to the 
elimination of the missiles that are already in place.86  
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The telegram is evidence of the fact that Diefenbaker was informed about the crisis only hours 
before Kennedy addressed the American people about the U.S. plan of action. In a meeting with 
U.S. Ambassador Livingston Merchant to discuss Kennedy’s address to the nation, Diefenbaker 
had the following response according to a memorandum of the conversation recorded by a 
secretary: 
Mr. Diefenbaker, after inquiring as to when the President’s message was 
delivered to Khrushchev [via press conference with the American people] and 
after commenting that he was himself a politician, said “let us face facts; an 
election is on the United States”; that he could understand that the President might 
find his speech to be politically helpful but that the quarantine was dangerous and 
a threat to Allies of the United States. The United States was not only informing 
the Soviet Union of what it knew, it was challenging the Soviet Union.87 
 
Diefenbaker believed that Kennedy’s speech was too provocative and that the quarantine might 
provoke the Soviet Union to respond aggressively. Diefenbaker was initially alarmed and taken 
aback by the aggressive tone of Kennedy’s speech, however by the end of the meeting 
Diefenbaker’s response shifted from “skepticism” and “antagonism” to a more “friendly and 
cooperative manner.”88 Despite the meeting ending well, Diefenbaker was offended that the 
Canadians were not informed of the crisis sooner. Under the NORAD agreement, Diefenbaker 
expected Kennedy to consult with him in a joint decision-making process. Instead, Kennedy 
disregarded the consultation and made his own decision regarding the crisis.89  
Diefenbaker also doubted Kennedy’s assessment of the situation at hand. After hearing 
Kennedy give the address, Diefenbaker proposed that a UN commission visit Cuba to determine 
whether the U.S. intelligence was indeed accurate. Washington interpreted this as a lack of trust 
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in the United States.90 According to historians John H. Thompson and Stephen J. Randall in 
Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies,  
Diefenbaker feared that Kennedy was too determined to erase the Bay of Pigs and 
the rumors that he had been routed by Khrushchev at Vienna and on Berlin. 
“Kennedy”, he [Diefenbaker] wrote, “was perfectly capable of taking the world to 
the brink of thermonuclear destruction to prove himself the man for our times, a 
courageous champion of Western democracy.”91 
 
The failure of the United States’ invasion of Cuba still very eminent in Canada’s memory. What 
later became known as the Bay of Pigs fiasco, was an attempt by the United States and Cuban 
rebels to overthrow the communist regime of Fidel Castro. The objective was for the CIA to train 
anti-Castro Cuban exiles (who became known as the Cuban Freedom Brigade) to lead a rebellion 
against their communist government. Despite the efforts of the U.S. government to keep the 
operation covert, Cuban intelligence loyal to Castro learned of the plans. Although President 
Eisenhower was responsible for creating the military operation, the operation was launched 
under Kennedy’s administration on April 17,1961. Even though the operation was no longer 
covert, Kennedy authorized the invasion plan anyway. In hopes of disguising U.S. support, the 
U.S. ordered the invasion to be launched from the Bay of Pigs, which was a remote swampy area 
off the southern coast of Cuba where a night invasion would have been extremely unlikely. The 
initial plan called for two air strikes, a 1,400- man invasion force, Cuban locals to join the 
invasion, and the establishment of a provisional government. American historian Arthur 
Schlesinger advised Kennedy on the military operation in a memorandum to the President, 
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I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba—
i.e., quiet infiltration, of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support 
through air drops. The beachhead operation, with the landing and recognition of 
the provisional government would represent, however, a change of highly 
beneficial result of getting rid of the Castro regime. 92 
 
Schlesigner suggested that Kennedy expand the operation in order to include the complete 
abolishment of the Castro regime. Despite the scholarly advice and alterations to the plan, the 
invasion failed miserably due to obsolete U.S. bombers missing their targets, poor weather 
conditions, lack of ammunition for the Cuban rebels, and a strong counterattack by the Cuban 
military that quickly crushed the rebellion. The invasion began on April 17, 1961 and was 
crushed by April 19, only two days later. Most of the rebel forces were imprisoned after 
surrendering, while others were killed during the struggle. After learning of the failure of the 
invasion, Kennedy vowed that the brigade flag of the Cuban rebels would soon be returned to a 
free Havana. Since the invasion, Kennedy was desperately trying to make up for the failure at the 
Bay of Pigs.93 Diefenbaker believed that Kennedy was using the Cuban missile crisis as a means 
to make up for this failure. Diefenbaker argued that the Bay of Pigs clouded Kennedy’s judgment 
in making an appropriate response to the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis.94  
Although Diefenbaker eventually came to terms with the intelligence provided, he did not 
give Kennedy the blank check of support that the U.S. president sought; in fact, he refused to 
even put Canadian troops on heightened alert until his Defence Minister pressed him to do so.95 
Diefenbaker proposed that the crisis be turned over to the United Nations so that they could 
survey the land in Cuba and provide their own analysis of the situation. Some Canadians 
                                                 
92 Arthur Schlesinger, "Memorandum to the President, April 5, 1961," John F.  Kennedy Presidential Library and 
Museum, President Office Files.  
93 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. "The Bay of Pigs." http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in- 
History/The-Bay-of-Pigs.aspx. 
94 Thompson and Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, 225. 




including the Minister of External Affairs, Howard Green, accused the United States of being too 
hostile with the Soviet Union and criticized the U.S. for their unwillingness to negotiate. 96 
Historians John Herd Thompson and Stephen Randall argue in their book Canada and the United 
States: Ambivalent Allies that for Canada the biggest questions of the Cuban missile crisis were: 
“Why use an ultimatum rather than negotiations; were the missiles in Cuba a real threat to the 
United States or only to the president’s prestige?”97 The conservatism of the Diefenbaker 
government clashed with the liberalism of the Kennedy administration thus creating different 
approaches to the Cuban crisis. Diefenbaker’s unwillingness to support Kennedy and Canada’s 
recalcitrant response to the Cuban missile crisis increased already hostile personal relations 
between the Prime Minister and the President. Diefenbaker blamed Kennedy’s “arrogance” for 
getting North America into this crisis.98  
Eventually, Diefenbaker conceded to NATO’s decision to put troops on alert and 
supported a blockade if the United States were to go to war.99 War never actually broke out 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, as diplomatic negotiations successfully diffused 
the situation; however, the crisis altered the relationship between the United States and Canada 
due to Diefenbaker’s delayed response. During the crisis, it is evident that the failed personal 
relationship between Diefenbaker and Kennedy affected the political decisions. It can be argued 
that Kennedy’s failure to notify Diefenbaker of the crisis when it immediately occurred affected 
Diefenbaker’s delayed response and mistrust of U.S. intelligence. As the United States closest 
ally, Kennedy should have brought the Canadians up to speed so that they could consult with one 
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another before making any decisions.100 It is also necessary to note that during this time Canada 
had an “enduring policy” with Cuba because Diefenbaker shared a common ground with Fidel 
Castro as both leaders sought to work with the United States while also rejecting their political 
dominance. 101 In a document brief on Canadian trade with Cuba dated December 23, 1960, 
Canada is cited as having “no limitations on such trade with Cuba.”102 Historian Asa McKercher 
argues that Diefenbaker’s “antiyanquismo” (anti-american) attitude affected his ability to react 
appropriately to the Cuban missile crisis.103 Diefenbaker’s delayed response to the crisis 
increased tensions between the two nations. Kennedy was furious at Canada’s response and as a 
result put more pressure on Canada to resolve the nuclear weapons controversy within 
Canada.104 
For the United States, the Cuban missile crisis was the highlight of Kennedy’s 
administration as he was credited with ending the nuclear threat quickly and peacefully through 
diplomatic negotiations. Instead of threatening war, Kennedy sanctioned an American naval 
blockade of Cuba until the Soviet Union agreed to remove its missiles from the island. Despite 
Canadian criticism that Kennedy failed to consult Canada before making this decision, it is clear 
that when Kennedy met with his advisors in secret, he decided to not inform any NATO 
members, not just Canada. Kennedy and his advisors feared that the intelligence would leak if he 
tried to inform other nations and they did not want the Soviet Union or Cuba to know that the 
United States had discovered the missiles. Another Canadian criticism was that the United States 
was too aggressive and hostile in its dealing with the USSR; however, it was Kennedy’s 
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willingness to provide an ultimatum that prevented a nuclear war. Kennedy later accused the 
Diefenbaker government of being unwilling to clearly see the situation at hand. 105 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s hesitancy and his push for a UN-led action rather than a 
U.S.-led action brought the personal tensions between Diefenbaker and Kennedy to a peak. 
Diefenbaker believed that Canada could serve as a mediator between Cuba and the United States 
however Kennedy viewed this approach as completely unhelpful and instead asked Canada to 
help the United States pay for its economic and naval embargo of Cuba.106 Diefenbaker refused 
to accede this request.  Furthermore, Canada continued its trade relationship with Cuba thus 
diminishing the Canadian role in aiding the United States in the midst of the crisis.  
Fortunately for Canadian and American diplomats, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and 
President Kennedy agreed on a deal. The Soviets removed their Cuban missiles and the United 
States agreed not to invade Cuba and to remove missiles in Turkey. This compromise led to the 
defusing of the Cuban missile crisis despite the fact that the Cold War continued to rage on. 107 
The continuation of the Cold War also meant the continuation of cooperation but also relational 
dissonance between the United States and Canada.  
The dissonance between the U.S. and Canada in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis 
actually proved to be beneficial for the United States. Diefenbaker’s refusal to aid the U.S. naval 
blockade of Cuba benefited the United States because Canada was able to informally gather 
intelligence for the U.S.108 Dissonance between the political leaders ironically strengthened the 
joint defense between the two allies after the Cuban crisis because not only were they able to 
protect the North American continent from the Soviets, but it also encouraged the United States 
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to look to Canada for intelligence, trade, and political relationship with Cuba. Due to its 
geographic location and proximity to the continental United States, a stable relationship with 
Cuba was important to the United States. The ultimatum that the United States made with the 
Soviet Union made this stability impossible without the aid and assistance of their Canadian ally.  
 
The Cold War’s Impact on Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty  
When the Cuban missile crisis ended, the United States and Canada were able to shift some of 
their attention back to the Arctic as they focused on protecting their northern flank from the 
Soviets. Defense of the Arctic became necessary for Canada as the conditions to claim 
sovereignty changed.  In order to claim sovereignty a nation must demonstrate actual occupation 
and the ability to manage, regulate, police, and protect that territory. Canadian Rangers (largely 
made up of Inuit) played a key role in demonstrating Canada's ability to demonstrate these sets 
of requirements by patrolling the region; In fact, the Rangers were sometimes referred to as 
Canada’s “sovereignty soldiers.”109 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nations could 
simply stake their land claim by putting down a flag and then returning home to their mother 
country to inform her of the new territory gained. During the post-World War II era, that all 
changed. Nations now had to demonstrate political and military presence in order to claim 
sovereignty. As the Cold War continued, the United States had an increasingly larger presence in 
the Arctic as they partnered with Canada in defending the region. While Canada needed the 
defense help from the United States, there was an underlying fear that the United States would 
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attempt to claim sovereignty due to the fact that they now had a military presence there.  
Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, the Soviets were a far greater threat than the United 
States was, therefore Canada knew that a strong alliance with the United States was necessary. 
As the authors of Arctic Front stated, “The winds of war blew closer to Canada, and isolation no 
longer suggested security but vulnerability.” 110 With isolation no longer an option, joint defense 
was imperative in the Arctic.  
In the new Cold War context, skilled foot soldiers such as the Rangers were no longer 
enough to provide defense of the Arctic. New technologies had to be employed to provide an 
adequate defense of the region, and chief among them was the submarine. In a 2013 article of the 
Cold War History, Dr. Adam Lajeunesse, a historian at the University of Calgary in Alberta, 
discusses the importance of the Canadian-American defense relationship in the Arctic with the 
development of under-ice submarines. Lajeunesse challenges the argument that the American 
submarine program in the Canadian Arctic was a secret program that undermined Canadian 
sovereignty. From his intensive research, Lajeunesse learned that the under-ice submarine 
program was very much a cooperative venture by the Americans and Canadians that proved vital 
to North American defense during the Cold War.111 Between 1960 and 1986, there were eight 
different U.S. Navy voyages, and historical documents indicate that the Canadians knew about 
the majority of the voyages. Only two of the voyages, USS Spadefish and USS Pintado, that took 
place lack immediate evidence to support Canadian concurrence or active participation.112 
Although the United States rarely asked for permission to voyage through the Arctic waters, 
Canada chose to be non-confrontational. Lajeunesse describes the situation:  
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As the United States had proven itself unwilling to request formal permission for 
these transits, Canada had only two options: to declare sovereignty outright and 
demand compliance or to work with the Americans and assert as much control as 
possible on a functional basis.113 
 
Canada chose to cooperate with the United States in order to keep the status quo and not start any 
more foreign relation problems; they already had enough to worry about with the threat of the 
Soviet Union.114 Canada opted for this discreet approach because it did not want the United 
States to do anything that could possibly threaten Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and wanted 
to avoid potential public outcry through the media. Cooperation was the only way to keep the 
peace between the two nations. This approach to foreign policy proved very successful, but 
mostly because, according to Lajeunesse, “the State Department and the U.S.  Navy continued to 
prove so sensitive and responsive to Canadian concerns,” meaning that there was no attempt by 
the U.S. government to undermine Canadian sovereignty.115  
According to Lajeunesse, the primary purpose of the voyages was research. The Soviet 
threat in the Arctic failed to materialize therefore the voyages lacked a military strategy other 
than standard surveillance.116 In the early 1960s, the Soviet naval fleet was small and hardly a 
threat. Lajeunesse argues that the threat of a Soviet attack was primarily based on “potentiality 
rather than existing danger.”117 In fact, the Canadian Nuclear Powered Submarine Program 
reported: 
….the USSR can acquire no major military capability which it would otherwise 
lack nor can it achieve any strategically significant result. Indeed, one can argue 
in all seriousness that there are few areas in which the USSR could achieve less 
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for a given expenditure of resources than by deploying its submarines to the 
Canadian Arctic 118 
 
Despite popular belief, during the early 1960s, a Cold War theatre in the Arctic was merely 
hypothetical rather than an eminent reality.  
 The lack of military activity in the Arctic did not hinder the Canadian Navy’s effort to 
continue its under-ice detection system and technology. The under-ice research was a joint effort 
between the Canadian and U.S. navies. The objective of this research was to improve northern 
anti-submarine capabilities and to create a fully operational submarine detection network.119 It 
was not until the controversial voyage of the USS Manhattan in 1969 that Canadian defense 
policy shifted towards the protection of Arctic sovereignty.120 Lajeunesse successfully supports 
the idea that the United States militarily supported Canada during the Cold War by providing a 
strong U.S. presence in the Arctic.  
 
Conclusion: Impact of Joint Defense  
From the emergence of NATO to the decline of the Cuban missile crisis, Canada and the United 
States worked closely as allies for the joint defense of North America. This era of military 
convergence transformed the political relationship between the two nations, which is often 
overlooked due to the strained relationship between Diefenbaker and Kennedy, 1957-1963. The 
impact of this era of convergence is evident in the Canadian White Paper on Defence that was 
drawn up in 1964, approximately one year after the Cuban missile crisis. The White Paper on 
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Defence is a primary source document from the Canadian Department of National Defence.121 
The document updated the Canadian government on the latest defense policy during the Cold 
War. The Honorable Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence in Canada, stated the primary 
objective of the Canadian defense policy: 
Preserve the peace by supporting collective defense measures to deter military 
aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our 
participation in international organizations, and to provide for the protection and 
surveillance of our territory, our air space and our coastal waters.122  
 
The document goes on to define the military relationship that Canada had with the U.S. and its 
European Allies following the Cuban crisis, with a special emphasis on Canadian partnership 
with the United States. In fact, in Section II of the White Paper, the Department of National 
Defence lays out “four parallel methods” by which the Canadian defense policy had been shaped 
around: 
(a) Collective Measures for maintenance of peace and security as embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations, including the search for balanced and 
controlled disarmament; 
(b) Collective Defence as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(c) Partnership with the United States in the defence of North America; 
(d) National Measures to discharge responsibility for the security and protection 
of Canada. 123 
 
The fact that the third most important aspect of Canadian defense policy is Canada’s partnership 
with the United States is evidence of how crucial the United States military was to helping 
Canada defend North America from a potential Soviet threat in the midst of the Cold War and 
also how crucial Canada’s military and political support was to helping the United States.  The 
White Paper highlights Canada’s inability to defend itself against the Soviet Union without the 
help of the United States; “the contribution Canada can make to the deterrence of war is limited 
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by the size of our human and material resources.”124 Canada relied so heavily on the United 
States during the Cold War years due to the vast territory it had to defend with limited manpower 
and resources. 125 The White Paper on Defence is a direct result of the era of convergence that 
was made possible through the joint defense of Canada and the United States from 1949-1963. 
 Joint Defense between the United States and Canada was crucial to protecting the North 
American continent during the Cold War. Without the effectiveness of joint defense, both the 
United States and Canada could have succumbed to Soviet aggression in the form of military 
attacks. Today, joint defense between these two nations is vital for historians and military 
officials to understand as the threat of Russia becoming a dominating world power once again 
emerges. In recent news, there is much debate about whether or not the Cold War actually ended. 
It is becoming increasingly more evident that the war never ended as new reports of Russia 
building up its nuclear arsenal are released.126 One can argue that the understanding of the 
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